November 1942

Eastern Front

Group Lascar makes a last attempt to escape from the Raspopinskaya pocket. Some try to break out toward the Chir but meet fierce Soviet resistance. After bitter fighting, a small force punches its way through the Soviet positions, leaving over 27,000 to surrender. With the surrender of Group Lascar the 3rd Rumanian Army practically ceases to exist, having suffered 90,000 casualties since the offensive began.

The IV Tank Corps links up with elements of the IV Mechanized Corps at Sovetski where the Germans launch an unsuccessful counterattack. Other units of the IV Mechanized link up with the XXVI Mechanized Corps at Kalach. The encirclement is complete. Paulus' 6th Army, part of the 4th Panzer Army (IV Corps) and the remnants of the 4th Rumanian Army are isolated around Stalingrad. The Stavka believe they have encircled 90,000 Germans but in fact a force of 267,000 is cut off. This force comprises 256,000 Germans and 11,000 Rumanian soldiers, 100 panzers, 1,800 arty pieces, 10,000 motor vehicles and 23,000 horses. Inside the pocket are the headquarters of Jaenecke's IV, Heitz's VIII, Strecker's 11th, Seydlitz-Kurzbach's LI and Hube's XIV Panzer Corps, deploying between them fifteen infantry divisions (including the 44th, 71st, 76th, 79th, 94th, 100th, 113th, 295th, 297th, 305th, 371st, 376th, 384th and 389th), three motorized divisions (3rd, 29th and 60th) and three panzer divisions (14th, 16th and 24th) in addition to the 9th Flak Division, 243rd and 245th Assault Gun Battalions and the remnants of two Rumanian divisions. Vasilevsky, reporting the success to Stalin, gains agreement that the most important task is to secure the outer ring and begin the destruction of the trapped forces. The fighting between 19 and 23 November has cost Paulus 34,000 casualties, 450 tanks and 370 arty pieces lost while 39,000, mainly supply troops and second echelon personnel, escape the cauldron to fight on along the Don and Chir.

With his army isolated, Paulus calls together his subordinate commanders, whose collective decision is to fight their way out of encirclement. Radioing Hitler for permission to break out, Paulus details the condition of his army. Weichs has separately contacted Hitler, but the journey from the Obersalzburg prevents communication. Only at midnight does Hitler reach Rastenburg, where Zeitzler goes to work to gain his approval for a breakout. Hitler seems about to agree, but Keitel and Jodl reinforce Hitler's own desire to hold on.

In an effort to force a withdrawal, Gen Seydlitz-Kurzbach, commanding the LI Corps, orders his forces to begin to fall back. The 94th Infantry Division begins pulling back from the northeastern face of the pocket. Seydlitz-Kurzbach believes that if he can ge the movement started, the withdrawal to the Don will develop of its own accord and neither Paulus nor Hitler will be able to stop it. However, the 66th Army strikes the 94th as it withdraws, and after a running battle the unfortunate division is almost annihilated. Hitler mistakenly takes the retreat of the 94th as an attempt by Paulus to force his hand and in a fit of pique remove the LI Corps from his control, making Seydlitz-Kurzbach directly responsible to OKH. Hitler unknowingly rewards the guilty party.

While Seydlitz-Kurzbach attempts to force the situation, Paulus draws the XI Corps from its positions in the Don elbow to avoid isolation by the 65th and 21st Armies. The withdrawal descends into chaos.

With the 6th Army isolated, Army Group B begins the task of building up new defenses along the Chir and Don Rivers. Gen Hollidt assembles a scratch force to defend the upper Chir while the XLVIII Panzer Corps, badly battered but reinforced by the arrival of the 11th Panzer Division, takes up positions to his right.

In five days the Red Army fundamentally altered the situation on the southern wing. The well-planned and executed attacks against the Rumanian 3rd and 4th Armies had clearly demonstrated the weakness of Germany's allies and the new-found confidence of the Stavka and the Red Army to carry through a complex offensive operation. Conversely, Paulus' inability to take control without continual reference to Hitler had, even at this early stage of the battle, condemned the 6th Army to a protracted battle in encirclement.