August 1943

Eastern Front

Glukhov falls, the 60th Army having advanced 50 miles into the German lines.

With the VII Corps on the southern flank of the 2nd Army now isolated from the rest of the army, it is given over to the 4th Panzer Army. This does not greatly help the 4th Panzer as it takes on the extra frontage covered by the VII Corps. On the southern wing the Germans begin a limited withdrawal in the 6th Army sector but this fails to alleviate the situation. Manstein orders the 1st Panzer and 6th Armies to begin mobile defense operations, this effectively being the prelude to the withdrawal to the Dniepr. Manstein has gained this small victory through long, labored negotiations with Hitler, who finally relents and allow a limited withdrawal only as a very last resort.

The Soviet force operating on the southern wing have reached hitherto unknown strength. The combined strength of the Central, Voronezh, Steppe, Southwest and South Fronts stand at 2,630,000 men with 51,200 arty pieces, 2,400 tanks and Su's and 2,850 aircraft, all of which are attacking weakened German infantry and armored divisions. Army Group South has around 800,000 men and Army Group Center approximately 600,000 but as few as a fifth of this number are combat infantry.

As August draws to a bloody close, the Germans count their losses. More than 218,000 ment have been lost during August (133,000 lost by Army Group South alone), of which barely 77,000 are replaced, just 33,000 of which go to Manstein. In addition, more the 570 panzers and 140 assault guns have been destroyed or captured, leaving the Panzerwaffe with 2,555 armored vehicles in the est, as few as one third of which are operational. Against the skeletal force the Red Army has a fleet of 6,200 tanks.

During August the Germans commit 2 infantry divisions to the eastern front, but in turn 1 SS panzer grenadier and 1 infantry division leave, bringing the German strength to 16 panzer, 12 panzer grenadier and 151 infantry divisions.

Kursk and its aftermath had a lasting affect upon both the Ostheer and the Red Army. For the Ostheer, the loss of its recovered armored forces was never made good, these divisions slowly being whittled away in one battle after another. Furthermore, the battle signalled the end of the German initiative in the east.

For the Red Army, Kursk was the culmination in a growing state of confidence since the conception of the Stalingrad offensive. The Stavka had successfully held its nerve throughtout the German attack and unleashed a series of unprecedented attacks thereafter. It now remained for the Red Army to perfect the use of its immense forces in deep penetrating offensive operations.