Early in the morning the regiments of von Küchler's 18th Army enter Paris and march along the Champs-Elysées. Le Havre has fallen. Gen Rommel writes to his wife:
At 8am Lt-Gen Sir Alan Brooke, who had been placed in command of all British units still in France, calls at Gen Weygand's GHQ in Briare to find out what use is likely to made of his forces. Gen Weygand outlines the position of the French armies, which has disintegrated into four widely separated groups and are now incapable of organized resistance. He then speaks of the defense of Brittany - 'an operation resulting from a decision taken by the Allied governments'. Afterwards, Gen Weygand and Sir Alan Brooke drive to Gen Georges's Headquarters. Gen Georges does not conceal the fact that he considers the projected Breton redoubt unworkable with the forces at his disposal - notably the 10th Army, now only a ghost of its former self. The idea of defending Brittany with the aid of a dozen divisions gradually built up by the War Ministry from officers and men returning from Belgium and from equipment dispatched from arsenals in the west and south 'seemed romantic' to Gen Weygand. He asserts that this plan has been adopted 'without consulting the High Command'. Since the Allied governments had decided to put it into effect, however, the Commander-in-Chief has to carry out their orders. In view of the fact that such British formations as were available are scattered about in the Le Mans and Saint-Nazaire areas, the simplest plan is to group them in the vicinity of Rennes, where they can participate in the defense of the Breton bastion. Under the impression that His Majesty's Government has endorsed the plan, Gen Brooke signs the following note jointly with Gens Weygand and Georges: G.H.Q., North-East Front - June 14th, 1940, 10:30 a.m. The French military leaders are hoping that this document will render them secure from any further misunderstandings of the kind that had arisen between Lord Gort and Gen Blanchard at the time of the Battle of Arras. Doubts assail Gen Brooke, however, when he gets back to his headquarters in Le Mans. He telephones Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and explains the situation to him. In his dispatch Brooke writes:
Soon afterward Brooke speaks to Churchill, who recalls in his memoirs: 'On the night of June 14, as I was thought to be obdurate, he [Gen Brooke] rang me up on a telephone line which by luck and effort was open, and pressed [his] view upon me. I could hear quite well, and after ten minutes I was convinced that he was right and we must go. Orders were given accordingly. He was released from French command.' Gen Brooke's own account continues: 'The Prime Minister agreed to my proposal... Moves to ports of embarkation were therefore continued. 'At 10:35pm I spoke to the CIGS and told him of the Prime Minister's approval for evacuation. The CIGS informed me that I was no longer under the orders of Gen Weygand...' Simultaneously Air Marshal Barratt limits the number of British fighter-planes authorized to take part in operations in France to 80. In the west a fierce attack by von Kluge's Army drives the remains of the 10th Army back to the Risle. The panzers of Hoth's Panzer Corps are streaming toward Caen, Argentan and Anençon. In the center the withdrawal of the Paris Army and the 7th Army has been made extremely difficult by the increasing hordes of refugees cluttering the roads. Between Paris and the Meuse the German advance is speeding up. The 3rd, 4th, 9th and 10th Panzer Divisions of von Kleist's Panzer Group have crossed the Seine at two points and are in Troyes and Sens. The left-hand column is heading toward Clamecy, via Joigny, and the right-hand column toward Monthard, via Châtillon-sur-Seine. At this point the German 3rd Group of Armies (von Leeb), hitherto playing a waiting game, goes into action. As Gen Weygand had foreseen, the battle now extends all the way to the Swiss border. In the course of the day Prételat's 2nd Group of Armies, in the Saar fortified sector, is attacked by 3 fresh infantry divisions enjoying air and artillery support. To escape the pincer movement that is starting to entrap them, the Allied armies in the east will have to outstrip the German armor heading for Belfort and Besançon. Unfortunately the orders to withdraw, given on the afternoon of June 12th, arrive too late. The Allied units are unable to start back in time to forestall the movements of the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, desperate efforts are made to avoid encirclement. The 3rd Army (Gen Charles Condé) hurriedly pulls back its front to the northern outskirts of Metz, in conjunction with the 2nd Army (Gen Henry Freydenberg), which is trying to hold out in Verdun. The 5th Army (Gen Victor Bourret) likewise pulls back. The task of the 8th Army (Gen Emile Laure), which forms a pivot founded on the Vosges mountains and the Belfort fortress, is to cover the withdrawals of the 5th and 3rd Armies, which have to strike much farther southward if they are to break out. Gen Laure does not hasten his departure. When he hears that the Germans are in Chaumont, however, he grows alarmed at the danger that might threaten his line of retreat, and orders the formation of an anti-tank barrier along the Saóne and the Est Canal, between Auxonne and Épinal. 'Unfortunately,' notes Gen Roton, 'this screen was to remain very precarious on acount of the scantiness of our resources.' A wholly successful aero-naval operation is launched on Genoa by the 3rd French Squadron, consisting of 4 10,000-ton cruisers - the Foch, the Algérie, the Dupleix, and the Colbert - and 4 flotillas of light cruisers. At the end of the bombardment the squadron returns to Toulon. The light cruiser Albatros is the only vessel to suffer any damage. She is hit at close range by a 152-mm shell from a coastal battery, but is able to reach harbor. |