The advance of Hoth's Panzer Corps speeds up. At 11am a powerful column of tanks reaches Gournay. This means the furthermost reaches of the gap, from Neufchâtel-sur-Béthune to Gournay via Forges-les-Eaux, are now in German hands for a width of 25 miles.

This advance makes the split in the 10th Army final. The western portion (comprising the IX Army Corps under Gen Ihler and the British 51st Division under Gen Fortune) is retreating southward in the hope of reaching a port from which they could re-embark. These forces will continue fighting for another few days.

The eastern portion (consisting of the X Corps, reinforced by the XV which has only just reached the front) is making a fighting retreat north of Beauvais. In the course of this retreat the X Army Corps and the 13th Infantry Division, hotly pursued by the 2nd Motorized Division of Hoth's Panzer Corps and by Gen von Manstein's XXXVIII Army Corps, are threatened with total destruction. They are to be saved purely and simply by the forceful intervention of the French 2nd Armored Division.

After breaking off action against the Abbeville bridgehead during the night of June 5th-6th, the French 2nd Armored Division had moved south of Poix, to the Grandvillers-Hètomesnil-Crèvecoeur area. There, along a front 6 miles wide and 2 and a half miles deep, it has set up a staggered defense line. Mixed detachments have been posted at crossroads to slow down the enemy's advance and enable French units to escape destruction. It is during this action, one of the toughest in which the 2nd Armored Division has been engaged, that Commandant Masséna, Prince d'Essling, is gravely wounded, at the head of his tank battalion.

In the 6th Army sector (Gen Touchon) the situation has likewise worsened considerably. During the night the Germans have succeeded in crossing the Aisne at Missy, 6 miles up from Soissons. In this morning German forces cross it at Pommiers, 3 miles down river from the same town. Soissons is therefore overrun on both sides. In the afternoon the two pincer movements connect. The Germans control a 25-mile stretch of the Aisne on either side of Soissons. By early evening there is a continuous, if shallow, German bridgehead between Vailly and Vic.

Thus the 3rd Group of Armies has been broken on both wings by the dual German advance upon Rouen and Soissons. The 7th Army, forming a shield along the Crozat Canal and the Ailette, is in trouble. On the left it has been outflanked by the German columns that have reached Roye; on the right by enemy infiltrations in the Saint-Gobain forest. Both are trying to close the ring behind the French divisions holding this sector (the 29th and 23rd Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Light Infantry Division). Bardies writes:

The encircled strongpoints resisted stoutly... But they were left unsupplied and unrelieved, and in the end they had to yield... Gradually the breaches made by the armor widened, outlfanking the near-by defenses, which had resisted at first, and enabling them to be encircled and then destroyed. Stage by stage the front was collapsing. It was essential that such forces as were still free should be rapidly pulled back.

In these circumstances the French High Command considers that it has no choice but to order the general withdrawal of the 3rd Group of Armies. The order is issued in the evening. The headquarters of the 10th Army is moved south of the Esine to Vaucresson (near Saint-Cloud), so that it can assume command of fresh formations.

Gen George's Personal and Secret Instruction No 113 lays down for the whole Group of Armies the maneuver to which they are to conform and the line along which they are to re-establish themselves:

The left will stand firm along the Lower Seine.

The center will cling to the 'Paris Defense Position' - a semi-circular line forming a shield in front of the capital, passing through Pontoise, Beaumont, Chantilly and Senlis, and supported by the Oise and the Nonette.

The right will halt the Germans who have crossed Aisne, along the Ourcq whose upper reaches run from east to west.

The new front of the 3rd Group of Armies will then be the following (from left to right):

• 1. From the mouth of the Seine to Vernon:
• The 10th Army (Gen Altmayer), reconstituted with fresh troops.
• 2. From Vernon to Boran-sur-Oise:
• The Paris Army (Gen Héring), consisting of several divisions, the remains of Audet's groupement de maneuvre and the right-hand portion of the 10th Army.
• 3. From Boran-sur-Oise to the junction of the Ourcq and the Marne:
• The 7th Army (Gen Frère), replenished with reinforcements.
• 4. East of the Ourcq, in the direction of the Champagne area:
• The 6th Army (Gen Touchon).

It is at this point that Rommel carries out one of his most dashing maneuvers. At 6am he suggests to the Army Corps HQ that his forces make a mock attack on Rouen, then turn off and seize the bridges over the Seine at Elbeuf. Headquarters agrees and the tanks move forward at 10:30am. The Andelle is crossed at noon, and at 2pm Sigy is captured by means of an attack from the west. About 8pm a company of panzers is dispatched along the road to Rouen to seize the crossroads five miles east of the town. Then comes the astonishing night attack on Elbeuf. Rommel describes it:

The darkness made it hard for us to follow the route with our inadequate maps. The din we made driving through the villages woke people and had them rushing into the streets to cheer us - for they thought we were British. We passed a French anti-aircraft battery; there was still a light in the look-out post and the sentry presented arms to us. At Les Anthieux we headed south and reached the Seine at midnight.

Our brakes shrieked and roared at the bends. A light shone here and there on the other bank; there were others at various points along the railway running through the Seine valley. There was no sign of enemy troops and everything seemed to favor the success of our raid on the Seine bridges, which were now only about 10 miles away...

In Elbeuf itself our vehicles became jammed in the narrow streets of the district north of the Seine. The task forces were late in arriving and could not begin their mission on time.

Thinking that all was not lost, I ordered the battalion commander to launch his attack on the 2 bridges forthwith. Under cover of darkness I myself approached one of them. There were civilians in the streets; the crossroads were blocked with sand bags.

The first task force finally moved in. It was nearly 3am. But the task force did not reach the bridge, for the French blew it up before our men had covered a hundred yards. A few minutes later the same happened with the second bridge. There was a series of heavy explosions, far and near, from west to east.

I was extremely annoyed at this set-back. I had not the slightest idea where the bulk of my division was. I therefore decided that we should withdraw from the narrow pocket into which we had ventured. The troops pulled out without a moment's delay. Luckily the Seine valley was bathed in mist and we had nothing to fear from the enemy artillery on the opposite bank.

Rommel's attempt to capture the Elbeuf bridges and von Hartlieb's attack on Rouen are thwarted. The French engineers blow them up in time. These bold incursions, however, still have one immediate result: 3 British fighter squadrons that had been refuelling at Rouen airfield decide to pull out and return to England. They never operate in this sector again.