The 12th Infantry Division reaches Dunkirk at 5am. Its progress has been badly hindered by the debris. It is daybreak by the time it reaches the eastern mole. A handful of officers and a few men try to escape inland. Others - about 150 - climb aboard the lifeboats of sunken ships. These desperate bids are seldom successful.

'Dunkirk has fallen.' writes Adm Darlan in his notebook. 'The two navies have made superhuman efforts and achieved the impossible. If this massive evacuation has succeeded, it is thanks to the tenacity of Abrial and Platon.'

The German High Command publishes a recapitulatory communiqué covering the principal events since the start of the offensive:

The great battle of Flanders and Artois is over. It will go down in military history as the greatest annihilating battle of all time.

When, on the morning of May 10th, the Wehrmacht began the decisive battle in the west, the Führer and Supreme Commander had assigned as its strategic targets the breaching of the fortified positions along the frontier south of Namur and the creation of preliminary conditions permitting the destruction of the French and British armies operating north of the Aisne and the Somme.

At the same time it had orders to take rapid possession of Holland and thus eliminate the territory providing bases for British land and air operations against the northern flank of the German army.

On June 4th the Wehrmacht can announce to its Supreme Commander that this stupendous task is accomplished... The first phase of this campaign is over. This considerable success had been achieved thanks to the exemplary performance of the Luftwaffe. For the full gallantry and momentum of our army on the ground could be fully deployed only within the area protected by our air force...

The full extent of our victory in Holland, Belgium and northern France can be gauged by the enemy's losses and the volume of booty captured. French, British, Belgian and Dutch losses in terms of prisoners are in the region of 1,200,000 men. To these must be added the figure, not yet known, of dead, drowned and wounded. The arms and equipment of some 75 to 80 divisions, whth their light and heavy guns, their tanks and all other kinds of vehicles, have been destroyed or captured. Between May 10th and June 3rd the Luftwaffe shot down 1,841 enemy machines, 1,142 of them in aerial combat and 699 with AA guns. Some 1,600 or 1,700 machines, at least, were destroyed on the ground.

Likewise at sea, the efforts to save the BEF with warships and merchant ships have cost the enemy dearly.

Sunk by bomber attacks were: 5 cruisers, 7 destroyers, 3 submarines and 9 other warships, plus 66 merchant and transport ships...

In addition, hit by bombs and partially destroyed were: 10 cruisers, 24 destroyers, 3 small destroyers and 22 other warships, as well as 117 merchantmen and troopships.

Sunk by the audacious action of light naval forces were: 6 destroyers, 2 submarines, 1 transport ship, 1 auxiliary cruiser and 1 unidentified warship.

By comparison with these figures and in view of the scale of our success, the Wehrmacht's losses seem trivial:

• 1,252 dead
• 8,463 missing
• 42,523 wounded

Officers, NCOs and men (in the above numbers)

Between May 10th and June 3rd the Luftwaffe lost 432 machines. The German navy operating off the coasts of Holland, Belgium and northern France has not suffered the loss of a single vessel... Germany commands the whole southern and eastern coastline of the North Sea and the Channel. Since our adversaries persist in refusing peace, the fight will continue till they are utterly destroyed.

The British had succeeded in repatriating 215,000 out of some 250,000 men.

The French had managed to save, at most, 125,000 out of 380,000 men.

'We were hoping to capture the whole of the British army,' Field Marshal Keitel was to declare later, 'but the forces at our disposal in Abbeville were inadequate and those on their way from the east did not intervene swiftly enough, with the result that a gap was left for the enemy to slip through.

Field Marshal Keitel, Commander-in-Chief of the German armed forces, paid tribute to the way in which the evacuation of Allied troops was carried out. 'The evacuation of Dunkirk was an astounding success,' he declares. 'Up to two thousand men were taken aboard a single destroyer... Never in my life have I seen a greater accumulation of weapons, vehicles, fuel, etc than at Dunkirk.'

But although the Germans had allowed some of the Allied forces fighting in Flanders to escape, the French, British and Belgians have suffered cruel losses.

The losses amount to:

• 22 Belgian army divisions (out of 22)
• 9 BEF divisions (out of 10)
• 24 French infantry divisions (out of 67)
• 2 light cavalry divisions (out of 5)
• 3 light mechanized divisions (out of 3)
• 1 armored division (out of 4)

-say 61 divisions out of 124, in other words 50 percent of the total Allied effectives.

At Pétain's trial Gen Weygand states: 'Three-quarters, if not four-fifths, of our most modern equipment was captured. Our units in the north were the best armed. They were our spearhead. The best of the French army was captured.'

'Thus was finis written on the Belgian expedition,' Paul Reynaud concludes laconically. 'That expedition had been undertaken against my wishes, and it would be childish to blind oneself to the fact that, in British eyes, the French High Command was to blame for it.'

From then on, France can count only on her own reduced forces.

In the east, from Longuyon to the Swiss border, she now has 17 divisions - either fortress troops or older conscripts - to support the fortified area and deal with a possible invasion through Switzerland. It is no longer possible to get hold of a single man from Lorraine or Alsace or the Alps.

Between Longuyon and the sea, to halt more than 100 enemy divisions, all of them flushed with victory, Gen Weygand has altogether (including the troops recently trained, recalled or conscripted from Africa):

• 43 infantry divisions
• 3 armored divisions
• 3 cavalry divisions

'But,' asks Bidou, 'could the word "division" stlll honestly be applied to them? Of the 43 infantry divisions ten or a dozen were termed "light divisions" and consisted of two regiments instead of three, while others were still being formed: the 2nd Armored Div had only 86 tanks and the 3rd 50. As for the three light cavalry divisions, they had only 40 light armored cars between the three of them.'

Such are the forces with which Gen Weygand enters into a battle on which the fate of the country depends.

2nd Phase - Battle of France

While the remains of Dunkirk are smouldering, while the motor launch containing Adms Abrial and Platon is drawing away toward the horizon, while the first German units are reaching the moles and while Gen Beaufrère, with Lt de May de Termont, is on his way to Malo-Centre to inform Gen von Kranz of the town's surrender, there are signs on both sides of the fighting line the preparations are being made for the second phase of the campaign - the Battle of France.

Indeed, for the past 24 hours reports by French air crews have indicated that the Wehrmacht is redistributing its forces for a new attack.

'At the end of operations in the north,' writes Gen Kesselring, 'came a period of regrouping southward... No one who saw from the air, as I did, von Kleist's and Guderian's armor veering round toward the Somme and the Aisne, after striking toward the Channel, could stifle a feeling of pride at the flexibility and skill of the German Command and fighting-fitness of the troops.'

As the giant German war-machine swings around, Rommel is ordered to the new fighting positions without delay, He writes to his wife:

We are on the move again. The six days' rest we have just taken have done us a world of good and enabled us to bring our equipment more or less up to the mark.

The new advance will not be very arduous. The sooner we get on with it, the better. The country hearabouts has been almost untouched by the war. Everything has happened so quickly!

The French have not been idle, either. Aiming to avoid a repetition of the breakthrough at Dinant and Sedan, Gen Weygand has conceived a defense echeloned in depth. As early as May 25th he had sent out a general order to the troops in these terms:

• 1. The battle on which the fate of the country depends will be fought, without thought of withdrawal, from the position that we now occupy. All officers, from army commander to platoon commanders, must be filled with the grim desire to stand and fight to the death. If commanders set an example their troops will stand firm, and they will be justified in compelling obedience from them, if need be.
• 2. To be sure of stopping the enemy, we must show constant aggressiveness. If the enemy reveals offensive intentions in any sector, we must rely with swift and savage counter-preparations. If the enemy succeeds in establishing in our front one of those bridgeheads that he uses for pouring in tanks and then switching to an armored attack, we must - however minute this bridgehead - instantly force the enemy back to his own lines by crushing him with artillery and aerial fire and counterattacking. We must meet infiltration with infiltration... This applies as much to divisions and to regiments, battalions and companies.
• 3. The whole area behind the principal line is to be organized as deeply as possible into a quadrillage ['chequer-board'] of resistance centers, especially along the main roads...
• 4. Military police are to block the rear of the divisional zones.
• 5. Every day divisional generals must see their colonels, colonels their battalion commanders, battalion commanders their companies, captains and lieutenants their sections and men.

Activity. Solidarity. Resolution.

WEYGAND

Since then, there has been a constant flow of minutes and instructions at all levels. They are inspired by three main principles:

1. Quadrillage

Plane-tank coordination having proved itself a powerful weapon for achieving and exploiting a breakthrough, Gen Weygand ordered the construction, in considerable depth, of staggered strong-points capable of being defended on all sides. The artillery would be enclosed in them and the enemy, after forcing the lines, compelled to negotiate them. Commanders of Military Districts throughout the war zone were instructed to ring the villages with barricades and install small garrisons to erect anti-tank obstacles strewn with mines and covered by machine-guns. What about units fighting in the open country? They, if they felt that they were surrounded, would adhere to the same principle. In other words, they would not attempt to fall back - which would be disastrous - but would set up a hedgehog defense and form 'breakwaters of resistance'.

2. Entrenchment of units

Enemy tanks would come rumbling forward, firing in all directions. If the defender did not let himself be driven back, the enemy desisted and tried elsewhere. So if they were to be masters of the situation, the French must not suffer losses, either when attacked by planes or when attacked by tanks. The solution was to be deeply entrenched. It was therefore laid down in the most imperative terms that, over the whole area of the battlefield, from forward limits to rear limits, all troops should take cover in deep dugouts and keep their eyes and ears open, in readiness to pounce.

3. Aggressiveness in defense

Far from allowing the enemy freedom to maneuver, the French must everywhere worry him, harass him, keep him under the threat of artillery and aerial bombardment, speedily mount attacks at every level, attempt to cross rivers, infiltrate on all sides.

Every fighting man in France, whatever his rank, is aware that the nation was on the brink of one of the direst hours in her history. Gone is the apathy that had characterized the days leading up to the German offensive of May 10th! This time France is not going to be caught napping: officers and men alike are steeling themselves for the onslaught. But judicious as they are, the High Command's minutes and instructions can not produce men and armaments from a top hat. And ever if they could, would there have been time to make proper use of them?

Gen Weygand's main concern is to screen Paris and keep the enemy's armor away from the barren regions of Champagne, from where it can threaten France's eastern armies with encirclement. He devotes his maximum resources to these two objectives. Having done this, however, he is afraid of having insufficient forces to obstruct the Abbeville-Rouen route effectively. His mind is so much on this part of the front that a few days earlier he had sent a series of orders to Gen Georges to emphasize the importance of the Somme sector:

The Commander-in-Chief cannot stress too vigorously all that is to be gained... from our controlling the whole stretch of the Lower Somme.

Consequently every attempt must be made to dislodge the enemy from the south of the river, seize crossings and establish bridgeheads...

An immeadiate crossing to the left bank of the river by German armored divisions would, if these instructions are not adhered to, enable the enemy to achieve a breakthrough, affording him possession of outlets from which it would become impossible to dislodge him.

Our resistance along the Somme would thus be compromised and our breakout made impossible.

WEYGAND

Gen Georges is in full agreement with the Commander-in-Chief as to the threat of the three bridgeheads that the Germans hold at the southern end of the Somme (at Péronne, Amiens and Abbeville). He is convinced of the need to reduce them, starting with the most dangerous: the one at Abbeville. As a result, he orders Gen Altmeyer to dislodge them at any price, employing units of the 10th Army, including the British 51st Division under Gen Fortune and the 2nd Armored Division under Col Perré.

A smiliar operation had already been attempted on May 28th-30th by Gen de Gaulle's 4th Armored Division, but in vain. After a series of costly attacks its remnants had had to be rested in the vicinity of Marseille-en-Beauvaisis. Would this new attempt be more successful that the last?

It might have been, had it been mounted with adequate strength. Unfortunately there is a shortage of men and equipment, and an even more telling shortage of time. The French have to act very, very quickly if they are not to be forestalled by an enemy offensive...

Sorely tested by the marches and counter-marches inflicted on it in the course of the past week, the 2nd Armored Division could have done with a few days' rest. Its crews are worn out. It can muster only 133 tanks.

Gen Altmayer, 10th Army Commander, and Gen Delestraint, Inspector General of Tanks, however, take the view that there is not a minute to be lost and that the operation should be launched at the earliest possible moment. Consequently they decide that the attack should start at dawn on June 4th and be made by the following units:

• 51st Highland Div (British);
• 31st Infantry Div;
• 2nd Armored Div (at full strength);
• 2nd Light Cavalry Div (to provide artillery support, on the right flank, for the tanks' advance).

Allied forces are to be positioned as follows:

• 1. On the left: 153rd Highland Brigade will attack toward Cambron.
• 2. Left of center: 15th Infantry Regiment and 48th Tank Battalion will push toward the old mill at Cambron and Yonval.
• 3. Right of center: Roche's Armored Group will have to carry out the main action, following a course parallel with Mont Caubert ridge. Its final objective will be the north end of the spur of the Camp de César.
• 4. On the right: 4th Battalion Cameron Highlanders, which had been placed at Col Perré's disposal, will support the Roche Group's thrust toward Caubert.

The operation, commanded by Gen Fortune, is to be in two stages: first, the capture of an intermediate objective demarcated by the northern outskirts of Mesnil-Trois-Foetus and the road leading from that village to Caubert; then the capture of the northern military crest of the Camp de César, which commands the whole area.

The assembly of units, carried out under cover of darkness, is slowed down by congestion on the roads. Ammunition trucks and infantry columns block and cut in upon the divisions' movements.

The attack is launched at 3:30am, after a brief but intensive preliminary bombardment. At daybreak, however, a heavy fog covers the whole area. Visibility is down to twenty yards. Col Perré writes:

Some of the tanks had to grope along and were held up for appreciable periods; a few even headed in the wrong direction... The infantry started moving forward on time, but afer a few hundred yards ran into opposition, the scale and proximity of which caught it unawares. The artillery observation posts were blinded by the fog and the batteries adhered imperturbably to their timetable, unable to make the adjustments for which these incidents called; some forty minutes after the start of operations they lengthened their range in pursuance of orders - abandoning all direct support, as it were, when such support was still needed.

Yet despite this set-back the units advance with admirable grit. Mesnil-Trois-Foetus, Villers wood, Youval and Vaux farm are captured one by one. Soon the intermediate objective is reached. It is even exceeded...

The Germans resist fiercely, however. They too realize the importance of the Abbeville bridgehead. Small groups of heavily armed machine-gunners fight from deep, narrow trenches terminating in an underground redoubt. When one group is knocked out by tank-fire, another instantly leaps into its place and keeps up the defense.

At 7:10am the first word of alarm comes from Col Roche: 'At 7:30am the tanks will have only another half-hour's fuel and it is impossible to refuel them in their present positions. It is urgent that the ground we have won should be occupied by infantry.'

Yet, fearing that the infantry might be left in the air if the tanks withdraw, Col Perré orders the refuelling to be carried out on the spot. This means a hold-up in operations resulting in severe losses. Of the 73 tanks that have actually taken part in the fighting, the enemy has destroyed 27; 6 others have broken down on the battlefield and been put out of action by their crews. To these figures are added 28 vehicles which are no longer in any condition to fight with the rest on their last legs.

In these circumstances Col Perré considers a frontal attack on the Mont Caubert-Camp de César spot, which is thick with minefields and anti-tank guns, impracticable. He writes to Gen Fortune: 'Resuming the attack with diminished resources, in the form previously attempted, can only lead to further failure. Re-engaging the 2nd Armored Div immediately would mean wrecking it for a long time to come. It is for the Command to decide whether it attaches such value to the Abbeville bridgehead. If so, the division could attack tomorrow.'

Gen Fortune likewise takes the view that the attack should restart with ampler resources - especially when he learns, during the evening, that the infantry is starting to show signs of fatigue. The company (part of the 17th Battalion of Chasseurs) that has captured Mesnil-Trois-Foetus is dislodged; the 15th Infantry Regiment is for no apparent reason falling back on its starting base; and the Scots, who have reached the intermediate objective, are beating a fighting retreat to Villers wood and Bienfay...

It is now dark. Within a few hours dawn will be breaking. Such a lot could happen between now and then... Wisdom surely demands that the attack not be remounted for at least three days.

But who could say whether, tomorrow even it would not be too late!