In the far north, squadrons of destroyers under the command of Adm Platon complete the evacuation of the two cruelly decimated regiments occupying the islands of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland, at the mouth of the Escaut.

The withdrawal proceeds as the British Expeditionary Force withdraws to the line of the Senne. The French 1st Army falls back from the Charleroi Canal to the frontier position.

Units of von Reichenau's 6th Army enter Brussels and force the French frontier position south of Maubeuge. They reach the Mormal Forest and emerge on to the rear lines of communication of the 1st Army whose right wing is completely exposed. The order to fall back has come too late. Lord Gort, as Col de Bardies comments, 'had good cause to be concerned'.

As a result of its bold tactics during the night, the 7th Panzer Division has advanced 50 miles since the previous morning. It reaches the Sambre and crosses it without any difficulty.

By dawn another battalion of tanks arrives for de Gaulle's attack. He now has 3, 1 of heavy 'B' tanks with 75mm guns, and 2 of light Renault 33s with obsolete short-range 37mm guns. He has no AA guns nor air support. On the Laon-Montcornet axis the French 4th Armored Division prepares to stem the advance of the German XIX Panzer Corps. Some of the forward elements of the division haved been in action against Guderian's vanguard since the day before. Lt Galimand has painted a harrowing picture of the confusion in which France's best formations have been thrown into action:

The first tank battalions arrived during the night of May 16-17th. The 46th Battalion of the 6th Semi-Brigade, originally intended for service with light tanks, had just been transformed into a battalion equipped with heavy 'B' tanks. It had never executed a tactical maneuver and had been allowed only one practice spell with the 75-mm gun... Heroism and audacity made up for ignorance and unpreparedness. The tanks fought their way into Lislet and Montcornet. But there was no infantry to hold the positions taken by the armor, and the Stukas were in action again. De Gaulle gave the order to regroup west of the line Chivres-Sissonne.

His tanks go up the road from Laon to Montcornet, cross the Sissonne Canal at Chivres, capture the village against some resistance and overrun a German reconnaissance column. By 3pm de Gaulle's tanks have fought their way into Montcornet. A couple of encounters with Germans in the village of Lislet left some of the French tanks knocked out and the heavy 'B's that attacked in the afternoon withdraw because of no infantry support. German artillery engages the tanks from across the Serre River. The French again withdraw because of no artillery with which to engage the German guns. Heading back to the morning's starting point, they are attacked by several waves of Stukas. With darkness approaching and some German tanks beginning to infiltrate his lines, de Gaulle decides to withdraw his division. He has captured 150 prisoners, but has lost about 200 men, 10 of his heavy tanks, and 40 of his light ones. This counterattack has had only minimal impact on course of conflict. It had only caused some momentary alarm among the 1st Panzer Div. Guderian handles the news himself, and does not inform Kleist. Had the attack been strong enough to be heard at Rundstedt's headquarter, the halt order may have been extended.

By a strange trick of fate Hitler is to bring about what de Gaulle and his 4th Armored Division has failed to achieve. On the morning of May 17th the Führer drives to von Rundstedt's headquarters. He is happy to find out the panzers have been halted until flank protection can be brought up. Hitler does not want a successful Allied counterattack. Besides being sound militarily, the decision is also political and psychological. Some of the German generals, however, knew there would be no counterattack. Halder knew there were only 6 divisions in the area which is not enough to counterattack and therefore the panzers are not in any danger. Hitler tells Brauchitsch and Halder that he ordered the slowdown to avoid falling into a French trap. He recommends the commander of Army Group A to pay the greatest attention to his left flank, which he considers dangerously exposed to a French counterattack.

Gen von Kleist speeds to Guderian's command post and berates him at not obeying the halt order. 'You have infringed the orders of the High Command,' he tells him. 'They limited your mission to crossing the Meuse and establishing bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. Why did you exceed them?' White with rage, Guderian protests and demands to be relieved forthwith of his command. Gen von Kleist is stunned for a moment, but eventually agrees. Guderian is ordered to hand over his corps to his senior general. Gen Rudolf Veiel, commander of the 2nd Panzer Div, is ordered to come see Guderian. Guderian then sends a message to Rundstedt's headquarters informing him he has handed over his command. Von Runstedt replies immediately and tells him to stay where you are and wait for Col-Gen von List, co of 12th Army, who was ordered by von Rundstedt to clear up this matter. Von List arrives in the afternoon and informs Guderian he will not be permitted to resign. Guderian is informed that the halt order came from Hitler, it was to be obeyed. Then with army group's approval, Guderian is permitted to carry out a 'reconnaissance in force' provided his headquarters remains where it is so he can easily be reached. This is just what Guderian wants. He climbs back into his tank and orders his units forward. The first obstacle now confronting them is the Oise Valley. Once again, however, the problem is not nearly as grave as had been anticipated. The tanks of the French 2nd Armored Division, stationed at the approaches to the bridges, hold up the enemy's armor for only half a day. Already Gens Hartlieb and Rommel, commanding the 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions respectively, have pierced the canal linking the Oise to the Sambre. By evening, Guderian's advance units have established a bridgehead across the Oise River, near Moy, 15 miles from Dercy and 70 miles from Sedan. Now they are only 70 miles from English Channel.

Only a powerful air force would have been capable of halting the progress of the German armor. But where is it? In the course of the meeting in Paris the night before Churchill promises to send another 10 squadrons to the continent. He has refused, however, to abandon long-distance raids over the Reich itself, and does not agree when asked to confine all RAF operations to the fighting line and the area immediately behind it. Yet this would have been the only way to influence the course of the battle.

Disappointed by the British Prime Minister's obstinacy, Gen Gamelin sends him another telegram:

May 17th, 1940

For Mr Winston Churchill, on his arrival in London

Giraud's army has been under attack since morning, south of Maubeuge. The fighting is very fierce. The consequences may be considerable, not only for France but for Britain. This line of attack is a particular threat to the communications of the British army. Once again I call for RAF participation in the battle, in every form. In particular, the laying of magnetic mines in the Meuse would do much to hamper enemy reinforcements and supplies.

GAMELIN

'As from that day,' writes Kammerer, 'Gen Gamelin regarded the situation as lost. He told Paul Reynaud that from now on they must face the possibility of an armistice.'

Pétain, ambassador to Spain, and Gen Maxime Weygand, Commander-in-Chief of French military operations in eastern Mediterranean, are both recalled to Paris in the hopes of boosting the Army's chance against the Germans. It certainly boosted the general public's morale, but for only a short time.