During the overnight period Gen Gamelin decides to order a general withdrawal of the French forces in Belgium. If the intent of this decision wes to aid the situation of the French units, the withdrawal needed to be swift and wholesale. As it turns out, it is executed too slowly and on too small a scale for its aim to be fully achieved.

Lord Gort, who favors the idea of the withdrawal, sends his government several telegrams on the subject. From these it emerges that:

1. He was to 'solicit' this order from Gen Billotte on the morning of May 16th.

2. The beginning of the withdrawal to the Escaut was fixed for the night of May 16th-17th. It is to be carried out in three stages and completed on the night of May 18th-19th.

Gen Billotte further stipulates that the intervening halts might be extended. Following this order, the Belgian army abandons the Anvers-Louvain position which it had expected to defend. The 1st Army follows the general movement and falls back on to the Brussels and Charleroi Canal. Though necessary, this withdrawal disturbs the unity of the alliance in Belgium. The British, and Lord Gort in particular, regards this 'breaking-off' as inadequate. On the other hand, the King of the Belgians carries it out reluctantly, for it meant he was handing his capital over to the Germans. The 9th Army, which is now Giraud's Army, continues its retreat between the Sambre and the Meuse.

Gen Portzert, commander of the 102nd Fortress Div, is captured. His 10,000-man division has been reduced to about 1,200. The 61st Div is also eliminated as a fighting unit this day. At 9th Army Headquarters, Gen Vauthier, commander of the 61st Div, reports he is only one remaining from his division although between 700 and 800 straggle in next day.

Huntziger reports to Georges that the planned counterattack did not take place, mainly because of unfavorable technical conditions and mechanical breakdowns. Huntziger blames Flavigny for these problems. Flavigny in turn blames Gen Brocard, 3rd Armored Div commander. The division was not ready at 3pm, but Brocard reported he had been ordered to disperse the tanks in order to cover the roads on a 12-mile front. Brocard becomes the scapegoat and is relieved of command.

Incorrectly concluding Guderian's aim was to outflank Maginot line, Huntziger pulls his army back from its position astride the Meuse. This permits the 5-mile-wide German bridgehead to expand to one more than 15 miles across. This move also makes an even wider breach between his army and Corap's, now Giraud's, on his left.

Gen Gamelin repeats his appeal for British air reinforcements. During the morning he sends the following telegram to Gen Lelong:

No. 529 Cab/D.N.May 16th, 1940

For Mr Winston Churchill
I venture to reiterate request for immediate dispatch of ten fighter squadrons.
Situation very serious. Naturally these ten squadrons would be base along the Lower Seine, where they are safe and whence it will be easy for you to get them back.

GAMELIN

During the day French units repeatedly attack the turning hing eof Kleist's panzer group at Stonne, causing substantial losses to the German infantry arriving to relieve Guderian's 10th Panzer Div. Guderian's other two panzer divisions are preparing to cross the Oise. During the evening Rundstedt orders all the panzers to halt their westward movement until infantry could be brought up to protect the panzer corridor's flanks.

The only favorable aspect of the situation is the regrouping of Huntziger's 2nd Army in the Stonne area. It is also reported that the German thrust in the neighborhood of Laon seems to be slowing down. If there a is chance of stopping the advance of the enemy columns and 'stabilizing' the front, that hope, briefly cherished, is soon gone.

At the end of the day, Guderian's lead units are at Marle and Dercy, 40 miles from the morning's starting point and 55 miles from Sedan. Behind Guderian's and Reinhardt's leading panzer divisions, for as many as 25 to 30 miles, except for a few supply units, there are no German soldiers. Guderian is at Moncornet.

Toward nightfall a German detachment approaching from the east succeeds in crossing the fortified position in the area south of Solte. About 10pm it reaches the Solte-Avesnes road, passes through the encampment of the regrouped elements of the 18th Division, without disturbing them hardly at all, and springs a surprise on an artillery group that is encamped along the Semousies road. Around midnight it halts on the outskirts of Avesnes, with all its lights extinguished, seizes some line officers who happen to be passing by, veers westward until it reaches the Landrecies road and finally enters Avesnes with plenty of light and clatter as though it had in fact come from Landrecies. This dramatic intrusion adds considerably to the confusion south of the Sambre next morning.

The raid on Avesnes is, indeed, one of the most spetacular and effective of Rommel's deeds. Here is his account of it:

The light was fading. In the growing dusk farms were blazing here and there, toward Clairfayts and farther westward. I gave orders for an immediate penetration of the fortified zone and as much progress as possible toward Avesnes.

The moon had risen, so that for the time being we could not count on real darkness... The long line of tanks drove through the line of fortifications and toward the first houses... In the moonlight we could pick out the men of the 7th Motorcycle Battalion who were advancing on foot beside us... Already we were 500, then 1,000, then 2,000, then 3,000 meters inside the fortified zone. Amid the deafening roar of our engines and the rumble or our caterpillars it was impossible to make out whether the enemy was firing.

Soon we reached the first houses of Solre-le-Château. The inhabitants were rudely awakened by the rumble of our tanks, the clatter of the caterpillars, the roar of the engines. Soldiers were camping beside the road, army vehicles were parked in the farmyards and in some places on the road itself. With a look of terror on their faces civilians and soldiers piled into ditches and trenches and flattened themselves beside hedges... We drove past long lines of carts abandoned by refugees who had fled in panic into the fields lining the road. We cruised on toward our objective (Avesnes). At frequent intervals I would take a quick look at the map with a shaded torch and send a radio message to Divisional HQ, to give them our position and let them know that everything was going well...

Suddenly we saw a flash from a hillock about 300 yards away and to the right of the road. Presumably a gun, well concealed in a concrete shelter, was firing at the flank of the 25th Panzer Div... I ordered the regiment to increase speed and fire salvos right and left as it cleared this second line of defense.

Firing began at once. All our shells were tracers and the regiment showered the countryside with light as it cleared the second line. We were quickly clear of the danger zone... There was utter confusion among the French...

We went through Semousies. It was the same story: soldiers and civilians fleeing on either side of the road... In Avesnes itself, which had been shelled by our artillery shortly beforehand, the whole population stood packed between guns and vehicles on either side of the road before our advancing column. Everything pointed to the fact that the town was occupied by a sizeable French force.

We had reached our objective and that was the main thing. But the enemy in Avesnes (there must have been a battalion of tanks at least) profited from the gaps that had opened in the procession of Panzers. Heavy French tanks lost no time in sealing off the road running through the town. The street fighting became fiercer and fiercer. The battle in Avesnes lasted till 4am. Finally the powerful enemy tanks were knocked out. The battle ended in the first light of dawn.

Meanwhile, in the sector between the Serre and tha Aisne, the crews of Guderian's Panzer Corps are weary from their uninterrupted exertions during the past 6 days and ammunition is running low. French resistance, however, seems to be weakening. Guderian writes:

In the market-place in Montcornet were gathered several hundred French prisoners belonging to various units. Their eyes betrayed their surprise at seeing us. A company of enemy tanks trying to enter the town from the southwest was taken prisoner. It belonged to Col de Gaulle's division, which was reported to be in the area north of Laon. I set up my command post in the little village of Soizé, to the east of Montcornet.

Still farther south, in the Sissonne area, the French retreat goes on, looking more and more like a rout. Between the forces now under Gen Giraud's command and the remnants of the 53rd Infantry Division there is a vast open space where the Germans are in control.

Throughout the day the exodus of civilian populations intensifies. There are already millions of refugees on the roads. They flee, accelerating their cars, pushing their hand-carts, under constant threat of being bombed and machine-gunned by the German air force. In their scattered houses they had enjoyed relative safety. Now they prefer to congregate in long columns exposed to the enemy's fire. Their flight is suicide.

The 1st Armored Division has been all but destroyed. The 2nd should have been brought into action but, but the splitting-up of this division and the irreconcilabe orders issued to it, prevented it from aiding Gen de Gaulle's attack at Montcornet.

Gen Georges orders the 9th Army commander, Gen Henri Giraud, and Gen Robert-Auguste Touchon, commanding the newly-created 6th Reserve Army, to attack the vulnerable flanks of German panzer corridor and clear the gap between Oise and Aisne Rivers. This attack is to be carried out by 1st, 2nd and 4th Armored Divsision. The problem is that not all of these units are available for the attack. The 1st has been all but annihilated after it arrived with empty fuel tanks near the Meuse on 5/14. The 2nd operating without its wheeled vehicles has been completely dispersed by the panzer thrust. It ends up that only De Gaulle's 4th Armored Div is available for an attack.

With members of his Staff, De Gaulle inspects the terrain east of the Sissone Canal, on which his offensive is to take place. All the roads from the north are cluttered with convoys of refugees and unarmed soldiers who had thrown down their rifles when ordered to do so by the Germans. De Gaulle writes:

As the sight of that distracted throng and those troops in headlong flight, and on hearing of that contemptuous piece of insolence on the part of the enemy, I was filled with indescribable fury. Oh, it was really too stupid! The war was off to an unspeakably bad start. So it was essential to go on. There was world enough and time. If I lived I would fight, wherever I had to, so long as I had to, till the enemy was defeated and the national taint expunged. What I was able to do later I resolved upon that day.

Throughout the day de Gaulle's units arrive in Laon exhausted. Only 1 of his 2 heavy tank battalions arrives. 2 light tank battalions arrive, but no artillery or rifle battalions. He commandeers some unattached artillery units. The 4th Armored Div is in no condition to go into battle, but Gen Giraud can not wait. During the evening de Gaulle discovers that the 1st Panzer is moving west of Montcornet, along the Serre River, 10 to 12 miles north of where his forces are deployed. He decides to attack northward the next morning. He will attempt to cross the Serre in order to block the road junctions that lead west and south to St Quentin, Laon and Reims. His immediate objective will be the three bridges crossing the canal at Montcornet, Agincourt and St. Pierremont.

During the night it is learned at Gen Gamelin's GHQ that the 61st Div, which had been fighting along the Meuse, is falling back on Compiègne. This news causes consternation at Vincennes.