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Von Küchler's army continues its advance through Holland. Huge bombing attacks continue against key targets and battalions of paratroopers fall in clusters from the sky. Encircled from the south, Rotterdam becomes a nightmare. Giraud's 7th Army, which is moving quickly toward Breda to support to the Dutch forces, runs right into Lt-Gen Hubicki's 9th Panzer Div, which holds it up. The Luftwaffe is called upon and the German air force intervenes in an all-out effort, swooping to the attack with bombs and strafing machine guns. The French 25th Div is hit hard. The mobile sections of the 1st Light Mechanized Div is scattered. As for the tanks, they have been unable to keep up with the army. In fact, they are being conveyed by rail and have not yet reached Anvers. Under these conditions contact with the Dutch army is impossible in order to determine the situation ahead. As Bardies writes: 'We did not have the means to attack the German forces and free Rotterdam in a terrain so interlaced with canals and wide rivers.' 24 hours after the launching of the attack, it is clear what the first German maneuver is: the initial objective of the Wehrmacht lay in forcing the Liège hinge. 'Yesterday's operations were astonishingly successful,' Gen Jodl recorded in his notebook. 'The armored units of von Reichenau's army, supported by Kesselring's 2nd Air Fleet, have swept into the breach thus formed, threatening the entire Albert Canal position from the rear.' At the very beginning of the battle the bridges at Maestricht, Vroenhoven, Weldwezelt and Briegden fall intact into German hands. The rapid advance on Rotterdam of von Küchler's armor has not allowed the Dutch forces to make a stand on the Peel. They fall back toward the center of Holland. This withdrawal exposes the left flank of the Belgian army, which is already being threatened in the center by von Reichenau's armor. The Belgian forces are thus compelled to pull back toward Tongres - a retreat that widens the breach in the Belgian line of defense. The Germans rush in and speed across the Albert Canal, using the undamaged part ot the Maestricht-Liège road. On the left the German advance is hampered by the fort of Eban-Emael, the battle for which had begun in the early hours of the previous morning. During the night of May 10th-11th a detachment of engineers equipped with hollow-charge mines and linked by radio with the paratroopers, who had landed on the turret of the fort, had crossed the surrounding moat in rubber dinghies. The final attack on the fort begins at 5am with grenades and flame-throwers. The fort surrenders at 12:30pm losing 200 out of the 1,000-man garrision. At noon Gen Georges sends the following telegram to Air Marshal Barratt, who is in command of the British Air Force in France and to Gen Têtu, Gen Vuillemin's representative: In view of the seizure by German detachments of the bridges over the Albert Canal southeast of Maestricht, I demand instant intervention by the British and French air forces to slow down the progress of the German columns which might use these crossing points in order to effect a breach in the Belgian line. This operation is to be kept going so long as the threat continues. The bombers, with fighter escort, try to demolish the bridges and destroy the enemy columns emerging from them, but in vain. They drop down to 1,500 feet to improve their aim. The German AA fire, however, is intense. One bomber is shot down and all the rest are damaged. The following day only one is available, the others have to be repaired or scrapped. From the beginning it is obvious that the Allied air strength is no match for the German's. Reichenau's 6th Army and Hoepner's XVI Panzer Corps cross over the Maas River at Maastricht on pontoon bridges erected by German engineers. They cross over the Albert Canal at Vroenhoven and Veldwezelt, just west of Maastricht. The Germans attack the Belgian 7th Inf Div deployed along the west side of the Albert Canal and wipe it out. By noon, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divs are advancing on Tongres 7 miles west of Eben Emael. On Hoepner's left, Gen Alfred Waeger's XXVII Inf Corps is advancing on Lie'ge. The panzers bypass the city and leave it to the infantry. The Maas-Albert Canal defense line no longer tenable. In the evening the Belgian command orders a general withdrawal to the Dyle Line, 50 miles to the west. About 1pm Gen Prioux's 2 mechanized divisions, deployed in front of Gembloux, find themselves in a heavy fight against the 2 Panzer divisions belonging to von Reichenau's army. The Germans are able to call on powerful air support, whereas Allied air presence is practically nil. Prioux's units, fighting in small groups, cannot withstand the onslaught of the German armor for very long. On noting the French inferiority in mechanized strength, Gen Prioux grows uneasy. His mission, with the Belgian covering army, is to gain the 1st Army sufficient time to reach the Dyle and take up its positions. With what he sees of the enemy forces initially, he realizes that it is going to be hard for him to do so. At 3pm he sends the following message to Gen Billotte, commander of the 1st Group of Armies;
While these operations are taking place in Holland and Belgium, von Kleist's Armored Group, which had crossed the minefields along the Belgian frontier during the night, has no difficulty in pushing the 5th Light Cavalry Division and the 1st French Cavalry Brigade back on the Semois. The decisive hour of the breakthrough is approaching. At the same time Rommel dashes off this note to his wife:
Later in the day, on his own initiative, Gen Gamelin alters the structure of the Allied High Command. He delegates his powers to Gen Georges, Commander-in-Chief in the northeastern theater. Gen Georges in turn sub-delegates his powers to Gen Billotte, commanding the 1st Group of Armies in the zone from which the French, British and Belgian forces are to operate. This double delegation of powers is accepted - not without objections - by the British. It is not yet known, however, whether the King of the Belgians will accept this formula, for it will make him subordinate to the general ranking third rank in the French military hierarchy. Leopold III is both a sovereign and the Commander-in-Chief of his army. During night a motorcycle battalion of the 1st Panzer Div crosses the Semois at Mouzaire before the defenders realize what has happened. This bridgehead is only 5 miles from Bouillon. Under French law the political and military direction of the war is the government's responsibility. The execution of the governmnent's directives is to be ensured by the 'War Committee'. There is no single, permanent and responsible command. There are three Commanders-in-Chief: Gen Gamelin (land forces), Gen Vuillemin (air forces) and Adm Darlan (sea forces). They have to supervise operations by their respective commands quite independently in all theaters. The idea of placing all available resources under the control of one man was envisaged only as a remote possibility. And he - Gen Gamelin, as it turned out - had merely vague and ill-defined rights of 'co-ordination', rights confirmed by a delegation of the War Committee. His authority over the air force is limited. He is entitled to submit 'direct requests' to Gen Vuillemin. He has practically no authority over the naval forces commanded by Adm Darlan. Finally, he had a deputy at his side, Gen Georges, who exercises the functions of 'Commander-in-Chief of the northeastern theater'. These functions, however, like the responsibilities that stem from them, remain confused and entangled with those of the Commander-in-Chief. This incoherent and pointlessly complicated system leads to: (1) an excessive dispersion of headquarters; So that in the most critical hours of the war - on May 14th and May 23rd, for instance - the French army will be literally leaderless, as a result of having too many leaders. The lack of co-ordination between the three French services is even more pronounced in the inter-allied sphere. The Belgian army comes under the authority of King Leopold III, who so far agrees to comply only with the personal directives of Gen Gamelin. As to the BEF, under Gen Lord Gort, agreement has been reached with the British High Command that it should comply with Gen Gamelin's instructions but not be subject to the orders of a general officer of lower rank, even if he is the commander of a Group of Armies. To the 2,800 or so tanks of the Wehrmacht the French, according to M. Daladier, can oppose some 2,600. Even allowing for those figures, the power and effectiveness of French armored units cannot be compared with those of the German Panzer Divisions, for the following reasons:
France's anti-tank equipment is inadequate both quantitatively and qualitatively. On Sept 1st, 1939, the French military had 3,800 25-mm guns and 300 47-mm guns. On May 10th, 1940, though she had consigned 300 25-mm guns to Britain and 400 to Turkey, she still has 5,000 of these and 1,200 47-mm guns. But the personnel allotted to them have not yet mastered their use. And the 25-mm gun has proved too light to be effective against tanks. 'We went into battle,' declares Gen Weygand, 'with 450 fighters and 60-odd bombers, of which barely 30 were of recent design. All the rest were obsolete and so slow that they could attack only at night.' They are up against 1,500 fighters (500 of them twin-engined) and 3,500 bombers. On May 10th the British air strength in France stood at 80 fighters and 150 bombers, shared by Lord Gort's Air Component and Air Marshal Barratt's Advanced Air Striking Force. To this numerical factor are added two others that still further accentuated German air superiority: 1. The presence, on the German side, of dive-bombers (Stukas) which are accurate in their aim and which are especially demoralizing to the French fighting man becauset he has not prepared for this form of attack.Yet despite all the disadvantages French troops frequently do wonders. |