The Belgian Surrender A sad day for Belgium and a sad day for the Belgian Army. On orders of its King, Leopold III, the Belgian armed forces lay down their arms, despite the fact that they are not beaten yet, although many formations are already less than half their initial strength. The photo is ironic in the sense that the victors, the German column to the right, use horse-drawn traction, while the vanquished, the Belgian column to the left, are fully motorized with state-of-the-art motorcycles. Very likely they are part of a 'Bataillon Moto de Chasseurs Ardennais'. The location is with great certainty the road between Koolskamp and Lichtervelde, to the west of Tielt.

About 9am a communication from the Belgian envoy, who is once again at Gen von Reichenau's headquarters, announces that the High Command of the Wehrmacht demands free passage to the sea for the German columns. The capitulation of the Belgian army dangerously exposes the left flank of the BEF. Gen Sir Alan Brooke hurries into the breach at the head of the British II Corps and manages to re-establish a continuous line of fire between Ypres and Dixmude with the effective assistance of the French 2nd Light Mechanized Division. After borrowing trucks from the Belgian army, the French 60th Infantry Division forms a stop-gap between Dixmude and the sea.

While this fighting is going on to the left of the Anglo-French position, to the right, in the sector held by the British 44th Infantry Division, a heavy attack from Saint-Omer pushes the Allies away from Cassel and the surrounding hills giving the Germans control of the area. They now hold much of the better terrain: the dry, bare, high plateau of Picardy while the Allies are defending the sodden Flanders plain.

Now there is a bottleneck between Cassel and Ypres as units of the BEF and the French 1st Army still fighting in and to the south of Lille will have to squeeze through if they are to reach the sea.

In fact it is in the Lille sector that the biggest operation of the day takes place. The 4th, 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions thrust out from the La Bassée area, seize the bridges over the Deule Canal and during the overnight period complete the encirclement of the rear units of the 1st Army. By morning nearly half of the French 1st Army, the IV and V Corps, is surrounded. Only the III Corps and the Cavalry Corps are able to escape to the west and cross the Lys River.

'The route followed by Col Rothenburg during the night of May 27th-28th,' writes Rommel, 'could be traced by the glow of the vehicles knocked out by his men. The Panzer division was leaving a trail of flames behind it.' The British 5th and 50th Infantry Divisions fire every gun they have and for a time manage to contain the advance of Rommel's tanks. The bottleneck is tightening, however, between Armentiéres and Halluin. The remains of the French 1st Army are going to have to negotiate this narrow passage.

Near Wormhoudt, 12 miles south of Dunkirk, 99 British soldiers of the 2nd Battalion Royal Warwickshires, attached to the 48th Infantry Division, are murdered by memebers of the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Regiment, under the command of Sepp Dietrich. The British soldiers, defending the western side of the Allied pocket, were trying to delay the closing of the German pincer jaws as long as possible to allow the rest of the retreating BEF to escape to Dunkirk. They held on until midafternoon on the 28th. However, without assistance of mortars, aircraft or tanks, the battalion is reduced to a few scattered infantry posts. Realizing further resistance is futile and taking advantage of a heavy thunderstorm, the battalion's CO leads about 65 of his men out of the town onto the Dunkirk road soon meeting up with other British and French troops trying to reach the port. Everyone does not escape Wormhoudt, however. Over 100 prisoners are rounded up by the SS and herded into a barn. They are hit by grenades and later SS men enter the barn shooting. About 90 men are killed, but 15 survive. No Germans are punished for this massacre. Sepp Dietrich was convicted of another act at Malmédy, Belgium on Dec 17, 1944. He gets a 25-year prison term.

Startled by the rapid worsening of the situation, the British decide to evacuate the line of the Lys and will adopt that of Poperinghe-Ypres during the night. On hearing this news, Gen Blanchard hurries to Lord Gort's command post in Hontekerque. Horrified, he explains to the commander of the BEF that after the German capture of Cassel and the Flanders hills there is only one way out for the seven French divisions that have just reached Lille in their retreat from Valenciennes and Cambrai. It lies at the junction of the Anglo-French forces. The British retreat will enable the Germans to encircle the French units and force them to capitulate. Gen Prioux, who commands them, declares that they are 'worn out and unable to move'.

To enable them to recover Gen Blanchard begs Lord Gort to postpone his withdrawal for 24 hours. Lord Gort refuses sayin he has categorical orders from his government to subordinate everything to the safety of the BEF. He insists that Gen Blanchard should order Gen Prioux back. He is convinced that any forces still south of the Poperinghe-Ypres line on the morning of May 29th would be irretrievably lost.

Gen Blanchard stics to his view and asks Lord Gort the following quetion before going off to see Gen Prioux: 'Will the British forces pull back tonight whatever the position of the French 1st Army along the Lys?'

After a few seconds of silence Gen Pownall, Lord Gort's Chief of Staff, replied: 'Yes.'

Indignant at Gort's and Pownall's attitude, Gen Blanchard drives straight to the 1st Army command post to inform Gen Prioux of the decision by the British Command. It will place the 1st Army in a tragic situation. In agreement Generals Blanchard and Prioux decide to pull back as much of the 1st Army as is still mobile. Two columns are formed. 7 divisions remain under Gen Molinié. They later attempt a breakthrough but fail.

Lord Gort complains of the jamming of the roads leading to Dunkirk and throws the blame on to the French, few of whom, he states in his dispatch, will abandon their vehicles unless compelled to do so at British Traffic Control posts.

Gen Blanchard states: 'The roads are terribly cluttered and constantly flown over by German planes. On entering the bridgehead, the British are compelling the troops to abandon their heavy guns and motor vehicles.'

The day is to marked, however, by an offensive effort on the part of the French. They will attempt to force the Germans back from the large bridgehead that they had established south of the Somme, in the Abbeville sector. The operation will be conducted by de Gaulle, with the hundred surviving tanks of the 4th Armored Division. The broad Somme valley with its peat bogs and ditches is an impossible place for armor. So de Gaulle decides to attack the southern face, on the plateau, striking northward to take the Camp de César which commands the bridges of Abbeville.

Orders go out to the units at about 4pm. It is now raining. There are breakdowns. The roads are cluttered and the crews are weary from their overnight journey. Delay followed delay. The preliminary bombardment has to be lengthened. Then the sky clears and enemy reconnaissance planes get busy. The advantage of surprise is lost and it is now much too late to reach the final target.

As night falls, however, the 46th Battalion, with 13 'B' tanks, the 47th Battalion, with 19 'B' tanks, and the 44th Battalion, with about 50 'R35' tanks, gaineground and takek a great many prisoners. By 11pm the Germans' main line of defense has been appreciably dented.

Meanwhile Adm Abrial sets about organizing the perimeter from his command post in Bastion 32 at Dunkirk. 'Despite incessang bombardment,' writes Bidou, 'he supervised shipping movement, food supplies and the distribution of ammunition with his usual calm.'

In the west the perimeter is buttressed by the Mardyck fortress. Thereafter the line of defense extends to Bergues via the Louis fortress and follows the canals to Furnes and Nieuport. Within the perimeter, to the north, lies flooded ground. The area is about a mile to three miles wide, between Bergues and the region of Les Moères. Only the raised roads are free. North of the floods comes another low-lying area and then the Dunkirk-Furnes Canal. Finally, there is a narrow strip of dunes bordering a large open beach that covers the whole breadth of the Allied positions and gently slopes down to the sea. There are no quays or jetties apart from those in Dunkirk itself, but along the shore, within about a mile of one another, are a number of seaside resorts: Coxyde, la Panne, Bray-les-Dunes, Malo-les-Bains.

Adm Abrial is responsible neither to Gen Blanchard nor to Gen Weygand. He takes orders only from Adm Darlan, Commander-in-Chief of the French naval forces. At the start he has only a few local troops to defend the perimeter on the landward side. To these he adds naval crews whose ships have been sunk. Finally he has 'under his authority' the land forces in the Boulogne-Calais-Dunkirk area, commanded by Gen Fagalde. Adm Abrial likewise has at his disposal the French fleet in the Pas-de-Calais, under Adm Landriau. This consists of all the French ships already used in the Dunkirk area plus all available small craft in the Channel.

Thus the defense and supply of Dunkirk will be carried out by all-French forces. Adm Abrial expresses amazement to Gen Weygand at the lack of support he is receiving from the Royal Navy and the RAF.

On being informed of this situation Gen Weygand addresses the following message to the British authorities through Gen Lelong, French military attaché in London:

No. 565/Cab. D.N. - H.Q. May 28th, 1940

The Admiral commanding Dunkirk stresses the need for powerful air> and naval cover to ensure the supply and partial evacuation of the forces fighting to defend teh Dunkirk bridgehead. I have no doubt this need is realized by the British authorities...

Meanwhile Adm Darlan, who had M. Reynaud discuss the possibility of an armistice before the War Committee on May 25th, rebels at the idea that France might be induced to lay down arms after 18 days of fighting, with her fleet still intact. After reflecting on the consequences that such an action might have for his warships, he sends Adm Le Lac, Chief of Naval Staff, a confidential note written entirely in his own hand and faithfully mirroring his frame of mind at the time. Here is the text:

Note to Admiral Le Luc

Should military events lead to an armistice with conditions imposed by the Germans, and should these conditions include the surrender of the fleet, I do not intend to carry out this order.

Consequently it would be advisable to give the following orders... so that they can be passed on at the appropriate time:

• 1. If Italy is at war with us and not party to the armistice, all fighting ships will engage the Italian fleet or ports in mortal battle:
• 2. Those that survive the battle will take refuge in the most accessible British port... ;
• 3. If Italy is not at war or a party to the armistice, all fighting ships, aircraft and auxiliary or harbor craft will proceed to the most accessible British port;
• 4. All ships capable of crossing the Atlantic... will rendezvous to assemble at Halifax, Canada;
• 5. Ships would obey an order to return to France or to a port in enemy hands only if that order were headd with and followed by the words:

On behalf of Francis-Xavier.

F.D.