During the night the British 5th and 50th Divisions evacuate Arras and withdraw to the Upper Deule Canal. Lord Gort orders the blowing-up of bridges over the canal between Béthune and Pont-à-Vendin. 'The gap between the Northern Armies and those operating in the Somme area was previously about 19 miles,' declares Gen Weygand. 'I was hoping to reduce it considerably and even surmount it when, owing to the British retreat, the distance was increased from 19 to 44 miles.' The British movements, therefore, make the Weygand plan impracticable.

Since his visit to France, Sir John Dill has shared Lord Gort's view. The salvation of the BEF lies not in the break-out toward the south as envisioned by Weygand but in a withdrawal northeastward to Dunkirk which would allow a swift evacuation to England if need be.

Meanwhile Gen Weygand, who knows nothing of the withdrawal ordered by Lord Gort, wires Gen Blanchard to put the preconceived plan vigorously into effect. 'Obtain close co-ordination of effort by Allied armies,' he tells him. '... Salvation lies in the continuance of your attacking maneuver... Am counting on the grim resolution of all concerned...'

Surprised to learn of the British withdrawal towards the Deule and the abandonment of Arras, Gen Blanchard rushes to BEF headquarters. Here he is received, not by Lord Gort (who is too busy), but by Gen Pownall, his Chief of Staff. 'Two solutions were considered,' Gen Blanchard writes in his report:

(a) withdrawal to the Lys and occupation of a bridgehead covering Ostend and Dunkirk;

(b) resumption of the Arras-Bapaume attack, with the Belgians covering the operation on the Yser.

The second solution seems preferable to Gen Blanchard, though he thinks it will be very hard to put into practice. Pending instructions from Gen Weygand, Gen Blanchard signs Instruction No. 40, confirming the order to carry out a counterattack southward and stipulating the conditions for its execution; 2 British divisions will have to take part in the attack.

Meanwhile units of the 7th Army under Gen Robert Altmayer are attacking southward toward Amiens. Their progress is halted about a hundred yards beyond the Bois Impérial.

Farther east, Gen Toussaint's 19th Infantry Division launches against Péronne. It is to storm the Somme bridges and then thrust onward to Bapaume. It is supported by the 2nd Armored Division, which has been hastily regrouped under the command of Col Perré. Unfortunately the 2nd Armored Division is now down to about 60 light and 10 heavy tanks. [The attack was launched with spirit, but the shortage of tanks, the strength of the resistance and the intervention of German aircraft, stopped dead 2 of the 3 assault columns. Only the third reached its first objective, Villers-Bretonneux.-Ed.]

Gen von Reichenau's forces (comprising 4, and later 5, divisions, but not many tanks) strike solidly at the extreme right of the Belgian front, on either side of Courtrai, and breaks through the lines after fierce exchanges. The Belgian 9th and 10th Divisions interven at once and for a time manage to plug the gap. The German bombers, however, step up their attacks, pulverizing the lines, batteries, fighting posts, convoys and approaches with bombs and machine-guns. The Allied air forces provide very little relief. The arduous struggle continues. The Belgian right is pushed back to the line Roulers-Ypres.

This automatically seriously threatens the British left. Lord Gort warns Gen Blanchard of the difficult situation in which he is placed. He announces that he is going to be compelled to withdraw still farther northward and demands reinforcements. Gen Blanchard designates the 2nd Light Mechanized Division to go to his aid.

Rommel writes his wife:

I am on the outskirts of Béthune. In splendid form. On the go from morning till night.

At 4:15pm Gen Weygand sends the following telegram to Gen Blanchard:

You inform me of definite withdrawal to Upper Deule Canal carried out by the British during the night of May 23rd-24th. If this withdrawal rules out preconceived plans, make every effort to form the widest possible bridgehead covering Dunkirk, indispensable for supplying battle.

'Thus,' records Col de Bardies, 'on the evening of May 24th, Gen Weygand abandoned his plan.'

The Führer calls an emergency meeting of his military advisers at his GHQ in Charleville. Gen von Brauchitsch suggests a large-scale armored attack in the Vimy-Saint-Omer-Gravelines area. His intention is to bring severe pressure to bear on the Dunkirk pocket, cut off the retreating units of the 1st Group of Armies and finish them off. 'The greatest encirclement battle in history,' declares Keitel, 'must end in the annihilation of all the British, French and Belgian forces still fighting in Flanders.'

Hitler, however, rejects this, for it seems to him to involve a needless waste of time. As he sees it, the fate of the Allied forces fighting in Flanders is already sealed. What did matter if a few contingents escape? They will have to abandon all their weapons and equipment.

Hitler sides with Gen von Rundstedt and decrees:

1. That the Panzer divisions should discontinue their advance northeastward. They should form up in the Saint-Quentin area, in preparation for the second phase of operations, timed to begin on May 31st.

2. That the task of ending the Battle of Flanders should be left entirely to the infantry and the Luftwaffe.

At the end of the meeting, to the amazement of everyone present, Hitler begins to speak admiriingly of the British Empire, the usefulness of its existence and the value of the civilization that Great Britain has introduced to the world. He compares the British Empire to the Roman Catholic Church, regarding them both as vital to general stability. 'He concluded by saying.' records Liddell Hart, 'that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that the world would regard as compatible with their honor to accept.'

The order to halt the advance of the armor is sent out to the corps commanders for execution. This unexpected order astounds the generals. 'Reinhardt's XLI Panzer Corps has already reached the line Aire-Saint-Omer, 20 miles from Dunkirk,' claims Gen von Kleist. 'so the German armor was nearer the port than the bulk of the British forces.'

When Guderian receives the orders to halt, he is flabbergasted. The order stated that all panzer divisions will halt immediately on the Canal Line, the name given to the network of waterways and canals extending from Lens to the English Channel at Gravelines. The purpose of the order: 'to allow the situation to clarify itself and to keep our forces concentrateed.' Guderian believes this order prevented Gen Ferdinand Schaal's 10th Panzer and Gen Kirchner's 1st Panzer from seizing Dunkirk and completing entrapment of Allies' northern armies. Guderian has received this order from von Kleist who had gotten it from 4th Army commander Kluge, who was now commanding both Kleist's and Hoth's panzer groups. Kluge had received order from its originator, Gen von Rundstedt, Army Group A commander, who issued it at 11pm 5/23. it was Kluge who had raised von Rundstedt's concern to the level of the action. He had suggested that the panzers should 'halt and close up', a move that would allow the Luftwaffe time to move its bases closer to the panzers' area of operation. Another factor that prompted von Rundsted to halt the panzers was a message from Gen Brauchitsch that the task of completing the encirclement of the enemy forces retreating toward Dunkirk will be handed over to Bock's Army Group B so von Rundstedt could concentrate his preparations for the drive toward Paris.

Hitler flies to von Rundstedt's headquarters. He finds out that von Rundstedt has already halted the panzers and puts forth the point that the marshy terrain near Dunkirk is not suitable for tanks and they should begin preparing for the next phase of campaign. A new order issued at 11:48am that no longer calls for a temporary halt to 'clarify the situation' but rather changes the army's plan fundamentally. Dunkirk is to be left to the Luftwaffe. If Calais proves to be too difficult it too would be left to the Lufwaffe and the ground forces are not to press the surrounded Allies too hard in order to give the Luftwaffe more room in their field of action. Halder is livid about Hitler's halt order. Army Group A is only 12 miles from Dunkirk, with virtually nothing against it, and now will be restricted in its role. Army Group B is 34 miles to the east and faces an unbroken Allied front with only infantry units. Arguing with Hitler does not get him to change his mind. Several of the higher staff had confidence that the Luftwaffe could do the job. Kesselring, commander of Air Fleet 2, however, does not believe it can be done. His forces are depleted and his pilots are exhausted. He points out the success of the blitzkrieg operations are due to close cooperation between the army and the Luftwaffe. But Göring merely replies, 'My Luftwaffe will do it alone!"

'I was right out in front, with the first tanks, near Bergues,' relates Gen Thoma. 'From there I could see everything that was going on in Dunkirk.' All the German generals are wondering just what could have prompted the Führer to issue this order. Von Kleist questions Hitler a few days later about his decision, pointing out that the Wehrmacht had wasted a unique opportunity by not occupying Dunkirk before the British escaped.

'Possibly,' replied Hitler, 'but I didn't want our tanks to get stuck in the Flanders mud.'

To others, Hitler explained that the number of tanks that had been put out of action was so high that he wanted to know exactly what the situation was before he advanced any farther.

Gen Busch, unconvinced by this reasoning, considered that the Chancellor had something else in mind. There have been countless arguments as to the real nature of Hitler's motives. After reading and comparing all the accounts so far published on this controversial point, it is impossible to draw any final conclusion. 'The Führer,' asserts Gen von Rundstedt, 'had counted on a speedy end to western operations... He deliberately let the bulk fo the BEF escape, so as to make peace negotiations easier.'

'That is an absurd theory,' counters Guderian. 'It is by capturing the whole of Lord Gort's forces that we might have brought the British to terms. To leave them with the units that would enable them to raise and provide the backbone of further armies was, on the contrary, tantamount to urging them to go on with the war and to strengthening their resolve.'

'Göring had undertaken to settle Dunkirk's hash with planes alone,' claims Gen von Kleist. 'He had begged Hitler to bestow the honor not on the army but on the Luftwaffe, thereby making the battle of Dunkirk a victory for the regime.'

'There are no grounds for such an assumption,' retorts gen Blumentritt. 'The Luftwaffe was mainly equipped with shrapnel bombs, which disintegrated, on impact, into a shower of small pieces and were very suitable for use against ground forcees. At that time it did not have the penetrative delayed-action bombs which alone are capable of piercing the armor of warships. Hitler must have been aware of this, since Col Köller, Head of Operations of the 3rd Air Fleet, had personally reported the fact to the Army Group. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in Rundstedt's hq the opinion swiftly spread that Hitler's order was dictated not solely by military considerations but by some secret political design.'

Only one thing is certain: Hitler halted the tanks and entrusted the end of the battle to the planes. By so doing, he and Göring gravely overestimate the Luftwaffe's powers of interception. This decision is to have incalculable consequences. It is the German High Command's first serious strategic blunder since the start of hostilities, for it enables the Allies to embark units from the Dunkirk trap that otherwise should not have escaped.

At 3pm Nicholson in Calais receives the message that he is to prepare his troops for evacuation beginning at 7am next morning. His brigade retreats to the city's innner perimeter, which encloses dock area, the old town and the Petit Courgain.